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This paper focuses on various textual elements in prose writing 
(footnotes, titles, and prefaces) such as they determine, and are 
determined by, the textual spacing of the page. Far from 
functioning in the way that the typographical, syntactical spaces 
between words do, or from replicating the pauses punctuating 
words in speech, such spacing is singularly and irreducibly textual. 
Functioning like non-phonetic marks such as parentheses, or 
expressing relations of hierarchy (as between footnote and text), 
textual spacing’s manifold functions belie their pristine blankness. 
I look at this textual spacing of the preface, title, and footnote, as 
its orthodox and deviational modes of functioning come to light 
in certain of Derrida’s readings. A second phase of analysis focuses 
on the unconventional spatial organization of certain of Derrida’s 
own texts—on his juxtaposition of cited texts in a determinate 
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two columns facing one another. To make sense of such gestures 
in the face of the derision they can occasion, I have recourse not, 
as one might, to French modernist art’s ostentatious engagement 
and display of its own material conditions, but to the conventional 
exploitation of textual space as analyzed in the first section 
devoted to the spacing of footnotes, prefaces, and so on. I 
conclude Derrida’s gestures to continue the tradition in which 
prose writing has innovatively availed of textual space to institute 
such conventional textual components as footnotes, prefaces, and 
titles—components integral to the apparatus of “the book” that 
gives material form to or “realizes” the logos. Derrida’s gestures 
are thus to be judged, not on the basis of the bemusement we 
might feel at an instance and mode of textual spacing that falls 
under no familiar convention, but only vis-à-vis their 
deconstruction of the text as an exhaustible totality of sense, and 
their visually attesting to the intertextuality interwoven in any 
text’s composition. 
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 central object of concern in Derrida’s writings of the late 
sixties and the early seventies lies with the conventions of the 
text. What falls within the realm of the textual conventionalities 
includes, in the first place, the system of alphabetic-phonetic 
writing itself. Derrida’s Of Grammatology reminds—if reminder  
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were needed—that alphabetic-phonetic writing did not fall from 
the sky ready-made or come into existence as a fait accompli; it is 
rather one tributary to have emerged from a much more tortuous 
and uneven development of systems of writing, from which 
ideographic, hieroglyphic, or ideogrammatic modes of writing 
cannot be included—or excluded—as mere waypoints along a 
teleological way. Indeed, it questions the notion that alphabetic-
phonetic writing is, in fact, as the phonocentric interpretation 
goes, reducible to the replication of speech, wondering if in fact, 
there are not elements in the alphabetic-phonetic text that are 
irreducibly textual.  
This would indeed appear to be the case when we consider not 
only such elements as question marks and parentheses, but also 
titles, footnotes, and prefaces. While the words making up such 
conventional textual elements are undoubtedly a replication of 
the vocalized words, the same cannot be said of the conventions 
themselves. Spoken discourse does not have such textual 
conventions as titles or footnotes, in part because they rely on a 
certain textual spacing, on a certain mise en page, on conventions 
that only the physical spacing of the page or book affords. The 
spaces between a title and the text it entitles, between a text and 
its footnotes, between a preface and the body of its text, are not 
the spaces of alphabetic-phonetic writing; they do not replicate 
the momentary pauses between words in speech. They are not 
governed by the syntactical rules that determine meaning at the 
level of the sentence. There are, then, textual spacings that have 
no correlative existence in speech. 
The focus of my paper is to address the nature of this 
irreducibly textual space and spacings. Rather than being drawn  
 




to the apparently positive material elements of the text—to 
writing, to words and their material inscription—or indeed to the 
typographical or syntactical spaces between words in alphabetic-
phonetic writing, I concentrate on the intervening spacing 
between conventional textual elements that is no less essential to 
the production of meaning. The blank white page, the vacuous 
spaces that writing and text “leave,” are as much facets of 
writing’s materiality as is its inscription. 
Derrida’s Thematic Analyses of and Experimental  
Ventures in Textual Spacing 
I first broach how spatiality or the spacing of the text is 
implied in Derrida’s analyses of certain conventional elements of 
the work of prose (preface, footnote, and the title), as such 
analyses appear within Derrida’s readings of certain philosophers. 
A logic and a set of evaluations, whereby the components of a 
work are related as part to whole, as body to supplement, primary 
to derivative, and so on, underlies the textual spacings and 
relative locations of such textual components as these.  
I look, in a second phase of analysis, at a number of gestures 
in which Derrida defies and, in creative fashion, departs from the 
customary manner in which a text is spaced, such as in Glas and 
in Dissemination. In the former, Derrida juxtaposes his texts in 












Fig. 1. Part of the first page of Glas.1 
 
Without an existing convention to orient our interpretation of 
the significance accruing to such unprecedented modalities of 
textual spacing, without being subsumable under this or that 
known typographical convention, the effects wrought by the 
spacing have to be inferred by the reader. And divining what 
Derrida is up to in this kind of spacing no doubt entails 
contextualizing these gestures within his practice of reading other 
texts, and his deconstruction of the metaphysics of meaning. 
 
1 Jacques Derrida, Glas, trans. John P. Leavey Jr. and Richard Rand (Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1986), 1. 




Following these analyses, I address the question of how we 
might relate Derrida’s innovative employment of modalities of 
textual spacing to the use of textual spacing apparent in existing 
conventional devices—in footnotes, titles, and so on. Are we to 
understand the existing conventions of textual spacing as different 
in whole or in part from those new modes of textual spacing that 
Derrida appears to inaugurate? Certainly, the spatial mise en page  of 
such works as Glas occasions in many a sense of bewilderment, 
bemusement, or irritation. Some are inclined to dismiss the gestures 
as artful playing, as the antics regretfully typical of the postmodern, 
or as an inappropriate invocation within philosophy of the 
modernist artist reflexively giving prominence the materiality of his 
medium. I argue that our determination of the significance of 
Derrida’s gestures, far from being made on the basis of the 
bemusement we can feel at a gesture falling outside any known 
textual convention, should be evaluated on the basis of it availing of 
the potentialities of textual spacing in a way not qualitatively 
different from the way in which the Western cultivation of 
alphabetic-phonetic writing has put to use the irreducibly textual 
space of the text, the page, and the book.  
The key to recognizing the relative continuity of Derrida’s 
textual gestures with the tradition lies, I contend, in recognizing 
firstly, that the textual spacing manifest in established 
conventions—the spacing that orchestrates footnotes, prefaces, and 
so on—is not that which operates in typographical spacing between 
letters and between words. It is not the spacing of syntax that plays 
a role in alphabetic-phonetic writing “replicating” speech. As 
irreducibly textual, these blank spaces become determined by 
conventional use. And secondly, it will be imperative to recognize 
that this use of non-phonetic textual spacing to create such 




conventions as titles and prefaces has been of great significance to 
the cultivation of writing that is differentiated from speech, and 
thus in the generation of the “rigorous” philosophical, academic, 
scientific work of prose so integral to Western rationality’s 
conception of itself.  
What in fact accounts for the bemusement Derrida’s gestures 
can occasion, apart from their not conforming to an existing textual 
convention, lies in the way in which they reflect a radically changed 
notion of the text, and of the status of the meaning it generates. As 
we shall see, Derrida’s gestures represent nothing less than the shift 
from an idea of the text as the Book producing a univocal meaning 
and issuing from a sovereign author, to the text as ineluctably 
intertextual, productive of a sense interminably in need of the work 
of interpretation. We can perhaps get a sense of this reconceived 
notion of the text in the intertextual juxtaposition of Derrida’s texts 
in Glas, as illustrated in Figure 1, which leaves each column of text 
constantly supplementing the other, incessantly in need of being 
related to the other. Such a textual spacing, significantly, mounts a 
barrier to the phonocentric determination of the text as but the 
transcription of vocalizable forms of meaning. 
Surrounding Spacings: Preface, Footnote, Title 
The spacing between textual elements such as the preface, the 
footnote or the title, and the text itself (the so-called body of the 
text) appears unproblematic. In themselves, they are a set of 
familiar unquestioned conventions that we scarcely notice; nor do 
we in fact need to process consciously their transparent functions. 
We “read” and presuppose this spacing of a text in our handling of a 
book, in finding our way around a work, in our familiarity with the 
spatial formatting, without the historical contingency or potential 




semantic implications of this spacing and formatting costing us 
much thought. It is perhaps fitting that textual spacing is read as 
blank; the spacings’ legibility lies in the spacing lending to itself 
being passed over. The decorative and thus inessential and non-
signifying typographical vignette or tailpiece inscribed in the spaces 
“left” by the distribution of pages, chapters, or between preface and 
text, suggests the space between, say, a preface and the body of the 
text, to be but a blank space inviting decoration. It is vacant; textual 
spatiality appears rather to be precisely that which in the text we 
pass over, and which we must pass over in order to arrive at the 
text’s meaning. It appears to be the non-signifying element, the 
function of which is merely to give to be seen the properly 
signifying elements. This seeming obviousness of the function of 
such spacing is brought into question in certain of Derrida’s 
readings.  
In “Hors Livre: Préfaces”2 (“hors livre” literally meaning “outside 
[the] book,” as in the etymological composition of “exergue”) in La 
dissémination, Derrida addresses the manner in which the preface, as 
customarily understood, operates by a logic of self-effacement, 
erasing itself as but a preliminary articulation of the work that does 
not properly belong to the work itself. The preface operates 
according to the strange logic of the future anterior: “This is what 
the book or work will have signified.” The preface functions as the 
signifier condensing the signified that is to come in the work itself; 
the relation it institutes between itself and the work is thus that of 
signifier to signified, the signifier erasing itself in the manifestation  
 
 
2  Jacques Derrida, La dissémination (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972), 9-76. Translated as 
“Outwork, prefacing” in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson, (London: Athlone Press, 1981), 
Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 1-61.  




of the signified. The odd temporal logic of the author’s preface—
by which it is written after the writing of the work, but precedes the 
text and is first up in greeting the reader—no doubt makes some 
sense if we attribute the author with being in a position to prepare 
the reader for the work only once s/he has finished the work and it 
has attained the status of a completed totality. The disorder or a-
chronology at the level of the composition of the work responds 
to a communicative or “pedagogical” need for the reading of it to 
unfold in a certain way, as a text written for the (uninitiated) reader. 
The curious logic or contradictions of the preface, a logic that 
comes second nature to the writing of a monograph in the 
Western tradition, is manifest in Hegel’s endless rewriting of his 
preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, and in his insistence, within 
the preface, that the very preface in which he writes this, counts 
for nothing—that it is in the work itself that the philosophical 
project is executed. But this logic has as a result, Derrida points 
out, the determination of the text as something other than a 
“completed totality.” It now “includes”—or excludes—the preface 
as a sort of parasitical margin or border, the status of which is 
uncertain. And the spacing that “intervenes” to separate preface 
from the beginning of the work “proper” becomes the 
embodiment of the preface as a “false beginning,” a “signifier” of 
its undecidable status. The spacing between preface and the work 
itself would appear, in an altogether conventional manner, not only 
to disturb the chronology of the text’s writing mirroring its reading; 
it would also, again according to its own orthodoxy, represent an 
entire structural logic that it in no ways figures or represents. The 
spaces that “enclose” the preface function after a fashion as 
parentheses. 




Elsewhere, Derrida devotes uncommon attention to the textual 
convention of the footnote. In “Ousia and Gramme: Note on a 
Note from Being and Time,”3 Derrida zeroes in on a footnote in 
which is condensed the whole question of Heidegger’s non-
accomplishment or truncation of his project of articulating the 
question of being in terms of temporality, and of his Destruktion of 
ontology. A footnote, in its generally accepted logic, has the status 
of a supplement, in all the senses of this word brought to the fore 
by Derrida: the supplement as the extra, additional, superadded, 
superabundant unnecessary extra, and as the addendum rendered 
inevitable by an original deficiency or a constitutive defectiveness. 
While Heidegger’s note as note ought to be a supplement in the first 
sense, the note in terms of its content and what is at stake in it 
gives it the sense of the latter. A footnote can always be so 
pregnant in meaning that it defies its relegation or consignment to 
a space apart from the main text, straining its status as reflected in 
its “lowly” setting reflective of the hierarchical evaluation implicit 
in their relation. Just as a title appears above a text, so too the note 
appears beneath the text, in accordance with a spatial 
hierarchization that is by no means a borrowing from alphabetic-
phonetic spacing. One might of course, as Derrida does, wish to 
see in Heidegger’s note an altogether different status from that 
which it has qua note. In presaging a work and a topic to come (the 
temporality of being and the Destruktion of ontology) that he does 
not and cannot treat of at a certain moment in the unfolding of the 
text, the note takes on, in this instance, a very different but entirely  
possible and justifiable function. It may be opportune for  
 
 
3 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1978), 29-68.  




Heidegger to mention the topic, but inappropriate to develop it at 
any length; the note allows for a certain reconciliation of these dual 
but competing demands. But what is significant for our purposes 
here is that this function can be assumed only because the spatial 
subordination, the spatial separation of the note from the text, 
remains sufficiently vague and nebulous to allow a plethora of 
functions. What is indicated is determined by convention, by 
precedent, the textual spacing on which the device of the note 
depends being entirely “insufficient” to regulate, prescribe, or even 
articulate with any precision the functions of its notes. 
The exalted and seemingly obvious convention of the title is not 
spared Derrida’s scrutiny in his opening to “The Double Session.”4 
In the opening to La double séance—at best an improvised title that 
was given by the editors who originally published the content of a 
couple of seminars that themselves went untitled—Derrida notes 
the later Mallarmé’s decision to suspend giving his works titles. 
Mallarmé resented the convention of the title “qui parle trop haut” 
(“which speaks, excessively, from on high”); he disliked their being 
hoisted above the text or work in a place of textual supervision, 
dominating and commanding the text that succeeded them. The 
title operates according to the fiction that the ensuing text can be 
reduced to a single signification. The poet would abandon giving 
titles to his poems, much as abstract painters would, aptly enough, 
cease entitling and thus designating what was represented in or by 
their works in the early decades of the twentieth century. This 
modernist gesture was seen as liberating the reader or spectator’s 
experience of totalizing pre-determination. Elsewhere, in Of 
Grammatology (De la grammatologie), Derrida’s gesture towards the 
 
4 Derrida, Dissemination, 187-286. 




title is different: in implying a title in the hoary form of “Of [such 
and such a disciplinary area of enquiry],” he ironically and 
anachronistically feigns the form used for works claiming a 
definitive, comprehensive treatment of a particular topic. It goes 
without saying that Derrida takes his determination of writing, and 
of the Book in Of Grammatology, to undermine any pretensions any 
work might have to providing the definitive, exhaustive treatment 
of a topic or branch of disciplinary inquiry. Indeed, beyond the title 
of this work, Derrida seems, exorbitantly, to include a number of 
traditional accompaniments to the main text (a foreword, an 
exergue), providing an ironic commentary on these apparent 
formalities, in which the totality of the book is fractured and its 
logic complicated. The mute spacing that the inscription of a title 
or the insertion of an exergue creates, cannot, of course, reflect 
these ironizing gestures.  
What unites the various textual phenomena cursorily evoked in 
these brief analyses—of preface, title, and footnote—is firstly, their 
irreducibly textual nature; and secondly, that the complicated 
relations they insinuate between themselves and other component 
parts of the text are made by irreducibly spatial, textual relations. 
They do not exist as such in speech, however much we might seek 
equivalents for them (say, the exordium for the preface, or an aside 
that we might cast as performing some correlative function to a 
footnote, and so on). This textual status, and the relations they 
open up by which they stand in relation to the “body of the text” 
or to one another, is indistinguishable from a certain textual 
spacing. Their identity is inextricable from the spatial layout of the 
page and/or the text. Such textual space must obviously be 
differentiated from the space or spacings in the figurative, 
illusionistic painting’s representation of empirical space and 
objects; the spaces bespeak a certain logic or structural set of 




relations that, while conventionally interpretable and quickly 
interpreted or processed, ought not escape our attention. Textual 
spatial relations function in a manner closer to a diagrammatic 
“logic,” perhaps more closely to the use of space made in non-
phonetic forms of writing, or perhaps, as such relations exist in 
abstract works of painting. This is a fact that would no doubt 
undermine those phonocentric determinations of the text Derrida 
has subjected to criticism, especially when we consider that the 
apparatus of the academic, scientific, and rigorous prose text relies 
heavily on these conventions, and the seemingly primitive, over-
determined relations of spacing essential to them. Not being 
explicitly articulated, being represented only by similar expanses of 
textual space, the logic or set of structural relations is rarely if ever 
consciously articulated, let alone examined intellectually. Derrida’s 
readings latch onto occasions in which the use made of a title or 
preface or note is somewhat exceptional and anomalous; as such, 
they shed light on the ordinary function that the textual spacings are 
burdened with—but also on the way in which their signification or 
function can depart from the conventional function attributed to 
them. 
Derrida is not content merely to raise the question of the 
significance of orthodox conventions of spacing as they inhabit 
and condition textual meaning; he has deployed spacing in certain 
of his own publications in a way that confounds our tendency to 
bypass it. To say that he has done so in innovative or unorthodox 
ways is to say that the spacing cannot be subsumed under existing 
recognizable conventions or categories. Before speculating on the 
significance of ways in which he avails in an unorthodox manner 
of “non-phonetic” spaces, I take up preliminarily remarks he 
makes on the organization of certain of his works and essay 
collections, in which the language of spatial relations that he uses 




cannot simply be reduced to a set of figures expressing a structural 
or chronological logic.  
Unprecedented Textual Spaces  
A. The Early Publications: Spaces Binding Collections and Texts 
In a bibliographical note at the end of a collection of essays, 
Derrida appears, deliberately, to conflate two levels of the 
organization of a book of essays—on the one hand, the physical 
binding and material sewing together of a book, and on the other, 
the editorial decisions an author might make in deciding upon the 
texts to include and the order in which they are to appear. His 
calculated conflation appears to suggest the logical or structural 
organization to be in fact a function of the inevitable spatial 
organization of a book. In this note at the end of Writing and 
Difference, availing of a series of “bibliographic” metaphors—the 
sewing of a volume, and the spaces that are left between stitches, 
the points made in an engraving, and the etymology of text, drawn 
as it is from a woven or tissue-like structure—Derrida writes in a 
manner that confounds treating the physical and editorial spacings 
of the text as distinct:  
By an interpretative sewing [in the sense in which the 
pages or a book are sewn together or bound], we will 
have been able, after the fact (après-coup), to draw or 
plot out (dessiner) [the system of the texts composing 
Writing and Difference or of deconstruction]. We have 
allowed appear only the punctuated points (pointillé) of 
this system, making or leaving room in this system for 
the spaces (blancs) without which no text could ever 
present itself. If text also means tissue, all these essays 




have intransigently defined the sewing [or binding] as 
a provisional binding (faufilure).5 
Faufilage, very literally “false sewing,” refers to the provisional, 
rough sewing together of  two materials—with elongated spaces 
left in between the stitches—executed prior to, and acting as a 
guide for, the final, definitive stitching. The upshot of  this dense, 
cryptic passage is that, notwithstanding the unified, definitive 
appearance that the solid, rectangular book or volume gives, any 
actual sewing or binding together of  Derrida’s texts (essays, 
readings), notwithstanding the definitive existence of  the published 
work as such, can only be a provisional orchestration of  their logical, 
intertextual relations. Their attaining a final configuration or 
systematic form is ultimately deferred, forever suspended or left en 
différance (that is, differing and thus deferred). Interspersed with 
differences that can always be rearranged, a final configuration 
exhausting the structural or genealogical relations between them, is 
forever deferred. What leaves the relationship between the various 
essays of  Writing and Difference, and indeed of  the relation between 
Writing and Difference and his other works of  this period, 
indeterminate, is the spacing between them.  
 
5 The note appears in the original French version at the end of a bibliography, but is curiously 
absent from the English translation, despite its translator—Alan Bass—discussing it in his 
translator's preface to Writing and Difference (trans. Alan Bass, London: Routledge, 2001, ix). I have 
modified the translation he provides in his preface. Given the complexity and relative 
untranslatability of this passage, I provide the full note here in the original, L’écriture et la différence 
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967), 437: “Par la date de ces textes, nous voudrions marquer qu'à 
l'instant, pour les relier, de les relire, nous ne pouvons nous tenir à égale distance de chacun d'eux. 
Ce qui reste ici le déplacement d'une question forme certes un système. Par quelque couture 
interprétative, nous aurions su après coup le dessiner. Nous n'en avons rien laissé paraître que le 
pointillé, y ménageant ou y abandonnant ces blancs sans lesquels aucun texte jamais ne se propose 
comme tel. Si texte veut dire tissu, tous ces essais en ont obstinément défini la couture comme 
faufilure. (Décembre 1966)”  




Responding to a question that Henri Ronse poses regarding the 
bibliographical note cited above, and the decisions Derrida made  
with regard to his publications in 1967 and 1972, Derrida refers him 
to the preface Mallarmé wrote to his prose poem, Un coup de dés (A 
Throw of  the Dice), in which the symbolist poet spoke of  the spaces 
(blancs) “tak[ing] on importance.”6 Along with this reference to the 
“blancs” (blanks, spaces, “whites”), Derrida’s epigraph to L’écriture et 
la différence—“all without novelty being but the spacing (espacement) 
of  reading”7—had been drawn from Mallarmé’s preface to this 
prose poem, Un coup de dés. This prose poem attained a certain 
notoriety for its words and lines unfurling across and cascading 
down its pages in a spatially unregulated fashion (as least as prose or 
verse unfolds according to a uniform spacing), in apparent 
harmony with the marine imagery of  waves, sails, and breezes in 
the poem, and the proposition that emerges in it (“a throw of  the 
dice will never abolish the play of  chance”). It is this spacing which 
takes on importance. Spacing, for Mallarmé, seems to be 
synonymous with the more or less arbitrary connections and 
configurations into which “elements” can enter and re-enter, and 
with the ineradicable contingency that haunts any determination of  
their relative positioning. Both his “Sonnet en yx” (the final line 
being “De scintillations sitôt le septuor,” “Scintillations at once the 
Septentrion”), and Un coup de dès culminate in dazzling evocations 
of  a constellation. Le Septentrion is as a constellation alternatively  
known or configured as the Plough and the Bear among other 
figurative projections. What accounts in part for Mallarmé’s  
fascination with constellations is the human need to impose sense  
 
 
6 Cited in Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1981), 3. The interview with Ronse can be found: 1-14.  
7 Derrida, Writing and Difference, vi. 




and meaning on them, but also the contingency of  the  
organization by which they can be figured and named in multiple  
ways. Once again, it is the spacing that acts as the not entirely 
determinative determinant. Mallarmé’s ideas here perhaps explain 
why Derrida not only responds to Ronse by suggesting that his 
texts might have been configured very differently, but by attributing 
the provisionality of  their configuration to the spaces that can at 
once figure their distinction and interrelation. In similar fashion, 
multiple modes of  threading Derrida’s texts together, multiple 
orders and organizations, are possible because the spacings between 
them open them up to being detached and bound to one another. 
They can always be stitched together or ordered and organized 
otherwise. The spaces, play, as Derrida says, the role of  “an 
undecidable resource which sets the system in motion.”8 The mute 
spacings between them remain inarticulate with regard to the logic 
by which they have been bound together, notwithstanding any 
lengths the conscientious reader might go to in seeking to re-
establish the logic by which they were organized.  
B. “Double Session”: Intertextuality Figured in Spacing  
The text in Derrida’s Dissemination referred to as “La double 
séance” (“The Double Session”9) is the published version of  two 
seminars given by Derrida. He specifies that he gave no title to the 
seminar, the title “La double séance” having been given faute de 
mieux by the editors of  Tel Quel in which it was published prior to 
being included in Dissemination. Each participant, Derrida makes 
clear, was given a page on which was set out a passage from the 
Philebus, as well as Mallarmé’s Mimique. 
 
8 Derrida, Positions, 3. 
9 Derrida, Dissemination, 173-286. 





Fig. 2. The opening page of  “The Double Session,” juxtaposing a 
passage from the Philebus with Mallarmé’s Mimique. 
 




The mise en page of  the cited texts is such that the space between 
them forms, as Derrida specifies, an angle, cornering or enveloping 
Mallarmé’s text, which is “embedded in one corner, sharing or 
completing” 10  the page or Plato’s text. The citations in effect 
preface a reading Derrida subsequently performs of  both of  these 
texts, of  their interrelations and differences. Of  this particular, 
deliberate arrangement of  the two texts, Derrida explicitly asks: 
“What is the purpose of  placing these two texts there, and of  
placing them in that way, at the opening of  a question about what 
goes (on) or doesn't go (on) between (entre) literature and truth?”11 
In a sense, the multiple lines of  relations he draws up between the 
two texts are condensed in the status and sense we attribute to this 
space that divides them yet makes them cohabit the one space.  
The cited segment of  the Philebus, while not explicitly 
mentioning the concept of  mimesis, Derrida says, describes or 
illustrates its system; it describes the manner in which mimesis 
organizes the thinking of  the relations between speaking, writing, 
and drawing or painting. Derrida starts off  by announcing that he 
is to engage the question of  the relation between, on the one hand, 
literature and, on the other, the philosophical question what is 
literature—a question he will not have dared to ask explicitly, at least 
in such an overtly philosophical or ontological form. The relation 
between literature and this question of  what it is, of  its truth, 
resonates in the textual and spatial configuration of  the two texts 
that precede his opening. The spacing would figure or invite the 
questioning of  what if  any trafficking, confusion, or interplay there 
is between literature and philosophy. But the texts, as representative 
 
10 Ibid., 183. 
11 Ibid. 




of  literature and philosophy, do not let themselves be taken at face 
value: Mallarmé’s putative literary text is a piece of  prose writing, 
and Plato’s dialogue and diegetic mimesis ought to caution us 
against their hasty labelling. Already this reversal of  sorts appears 
to contaminate the space’s purity as one dividing literature and 
philosophy.  
Let us work our way through certain of  the numerous 
significations that accrue to this space, the significations that seem 
to multiply by virtue of  the very aridity of  this space, of  its vacuity 
as a sign. Between the texts, there lies the whole history of  mimesis 
that has dominated Western reflections on literature, and that, no 
doubt, has influenced and been influenced by the praxis of  
literature. The blank but pregnant space between Plato and 
Mallarmé’s texts invites us to contemplate a theme common to 
them (mimesis) within a shared, Western tradition. Derrida’s 
reading of  these two texts teases out the inflections they give to 
this seminal Western concept. Since the Mallarmean text would be 
impossible without Plato’s inauguration of  mimesis as a dominant 
motif  in Western thought, and as they might be said to be a 
scarcely veiled commentary on them, one might say that 
Mallarmé’s reflections on mimesis in Mimique themselves constitute 
a mimetic copy of  Plato—not an eikastic, faithful copy, but a 
phantastic, unrecognizable simulacra of  Plato’s mimesis. The space 
would thus be the very space between representations of  mimesis, 
between one representation of  mimesis and another. The space 
figures the discontinuity, the radical departure that Mallarmé 
makes, a departure that nonetheless takes off  from a point of  
overlap with Plato (the concept of  mimesis). It measures out a 
continuity, a line of  descent, but also encloses within the text an 
internecine conflict, an invaginated pocket of  irresolvable tension. 




What takes place in the spacing between the two texts is also the 
history of  metaphysics that elapses between the philosopher most 
readily identified with the inauguration of  that tradition, and a poet 
associated with the end of  metaphysics in modernity. Moreover, in 
the course of  his introductory remarks, Derrida suggests that he 
might have given his work the title “Hymen: INTER Platonem et 
Mallarmatum.”12 The significance or implication of  Derrida writing 
this abandoned title in Latin is evident enough: what lies between 
the two is the translation of  ancient Greek thought into Latin and 
the romantic languages, which has at once distorted and preserved, 
altered yet perpetuated Greek thought. The allusion to “hymen,” a 
word that Mallarmé has occasion to use, can mean both virginity 
(the “intact” hymen) and consummation of marriage (the hymen as 
breached); this ambivalence is due to the hymen’s anatomical 
ambiguity, as opening and closing, as veil and fold (“voile” and 
“pli” are words that occur frequently in Mallarmé). And in 
“INTER,” just as in entre (between), the antagonistic senses of  a 
relation and a disjunction, a cleavage and a conjunction, are 
signified.  
Is the spacing in question then a distorting compression, a 
condensation of  too much that will have taken place in between 
the two cited texts? Derrida’s response suggests the space of  
commerce and of  incommensurability between the texts to 
overflow with potential meanings or be hermeneutically 
inexhaustible. And this inability to pin down an ultimate sense or 
set down an interpretation of  the relation between Mallarmé and 








The spacing between the texts remains indefinable, un-entitled, or 
forever to-be-entitled, enveloping rather than enveloped by the 
discourse of  Derrida’s own text. The espacement invites the 
questioning, without the ensuing text claiming to ever reach an 
absolute determination of  it.  
The inclusion of  this Plato/Mallarmé page opens up another 
space—that between the two texts and Derrida’s own text. 
Derrida’s inclusion of  this spacing perhaps ought to be less 
surprising than it appears. For Derrida’s texts are invariably the 
performances of  readings of  other texts. Instantiating a relation 
with another author or text that is irreducible to mere citation, 
commentary, or critique, Derrida’s readings of  texts are immersed 
in the text being read. Least of  all is the work being deconstructed 
a historical text serving as mere launch pad for a new, independent 
philosophical work claiming complete independence from it. His 
writing confuses the ordinary conception of  reading and writing as 
exclusive activities, if  by reading we understand an activity that 
precedes and is conducted separately from the writing of  our 
“own” texts. Each of  his texts envelops within itself  a figurative 
space between his own reading and that text. Derrida’s writings 
start out from other texts, without ever beginning anew, or 
extricating themselves from the reading of  other texts—these 
other texts being understood as implicated in one another by 
belonging to a tradition, and as undergirded by a conceptual 
network that traverses different languages. Ordinarily, the notion 
of  intertextuality is understood as designating the influences that 
other texts will have had upon the writing and writer of  a text, the 
other texts that will have fed into its writing outside of  the 
conscious awareness or acknowledgement of  the writer. It 
ordinarily designates a sort of  passivity, a powerlessness on the 




part of  the author to command—in the moment that they bear on 
the writer—all the sources, texts, and influences that will have 
shaped that author’s writings and ideas. Internalizing the relations 
between the Mallarmé text and Plato’s within Derrida’s own text 
seems to invoke the sense of  an active intertextuality. Derrida is 
writing in the margins of  other texts; in “The Double Session,” 
Derrida allows this marginality to be figured by and recognized in a 
textual spatiality that exceeds the spatiality of  an epigraph or of  a 
block citation. It seems at least comprehensible for the set of  
relations between Derrida’s text—and the two related texts he is 
reading—to be materially formalized in the manner in which he 
lays out “The Double Session.” It seems in keeping with tradition 
for this to be performed in a manner that goes beyond existing 
conventions, which themselves were introduced at historical 
junctures and once constituted innovations, and no doubt once 
seemed superfluous (citation, indented block citing, the epigraph 
that alludes to a principle casting its illumination over a text, the 
bibliography suggesting a range of  works that fed into the text, 
and so on). However much we might balk at the non-conventional 
gesture that only uneasily lets itself  be assimilated within our 
understanding, and however much we might fail to recognize or 
admit logical relations to be comprehensible only by virtue of  
figures, Derrida’s attempts to devise modalities of  textual spacing 
ought not to be regarded as lacking in continuity with existing 
conventions.  
C. Glas: Spacing between Two Columns  
We have seen how Derrida embroiders the relations between 
the texts of  his early work in a language that permits no separation 
between the purely logical and the bibliographical language. We 




have also seen how the juxtaposition of  cited texts in a particular, 
determinate configuration resonates with the reading Derrida 
performs of  them. There remains one other Derridian gesture 
regarding textual spatiality to be analyzed. Derrida’s Glas is perhaps 
best known for Derrida situating two texts, both written by him, 
on the one page such that they face one another. In one column, 
Derrida reflects on Hegel, and, in the other, on Genet. The 
columns are spaced in such a way that we might describe them—
were simultaneous reading of  them not an impossibility—as 
running concurrently. Given that the “Hegel column” stands on 
the left-hand side, we might, in accordance with the convention by 
which reading commences from the left, be inclined to ascribe to it 
some precedence, if  not priority. The reading of  the work(s) is 
complicated yet further by the texts, within each column, not 
simply flowing in an orthodox linear manner; constant asides 
(“text-boxes,” we might say) are interspersed throughout, with a 
seeming variety of  functions, such as elaborating on words or 
etymologies. I cannot here perform the sort of  close reading 
required to identify how the two columns deal with intimately 
related themes, and that would be necessary to tease out how the 
mise en page of  the two columns bears on the trafficking in meaning 
at given moments in the text. But some of  the general effects of  the 
textual positioning might be emphasized here. 
Is one to read one page at a time, and thus two texts? Or is one 
to read one text first and then the other? The distribution of  the 
texts, dispersed across the page, disturbs or confuses the simple 
linearity of  reading by which a text unfolds according to a 
temporality where a clear beginning unfolds “inexorably” toward 
an unambiguous end-point, interrupted perhaps by the back-and-
forth movement or digression towards footnotes the text 




commends. Glas seems to lay emphasis on this very point—on the 
false start or false starting point—precisely by not beginning within 
a complete opening sentence, that is, with a sentence that begins with 
a capital initial and that includes a grammatically coherent point of  
departure. Its opening pitches the reader into a truncated sentence; 
the text has already begun, and begins only in reference to another 
text. We have already seen how “The Double Session” begins, as it 
were, from an intertextual space, from the difference between two 
texts, refuting any notion of  the text being its own, singular 
wellspring. The spacing of  the columns referring one text to 
another challenges the text’s pretensions to constituting a singular, 
independent and whole entity. Indeed Derrida’s spacing determines 
the status of  each text as a supplement; it determines each column 
as not being read or interpreted until the one column is referred to 
the other. The system of relations between texts composing “one 
and the same text or work,” confronting the reader with a non-
linear sequential experience of reading—with choices with regard 
to what to read first—undermines the orthodox visual presentation 
of a text or work that is conducive to construing it to constitute an 
independent totality. Neither column allows itself  to be produced 
or reproduced purely and simply as speech; it precludes a 
“translation” of  it “back” into the spoken word, back into meaning 
as determined by language conceived as the spoken word. The 
column will always have a remainder, one that is irreducibly textual 
without being alphabetic-phonetic writing. The reading and 
interpretation of  each column cannot be said to be complete until 
it is referred and related to the other column.  
With this, we move to a conclusion, in which Derrida’s non-
conventional use of  a non-phonetic and non-syntactical spacing 
can be described, on the one hand, as undermining a phonocentric 




tradition, but, on the other, as in keeping with the tradition by 
which the Western prose text has become what it is in part through 
innovations in textual spacing.  
Conclusion: A Textual Space Beyond Hegelianism, a Space 
of  Writing Beyond the Voice, a Space Left for Interpretation   
Derrida has recruited certain potentialities of  textual spacing in 
order to suggest a whole series of  relations between elements in 
his texts (cited passages, his own texts) in line with his conception 
of  the text as composite and its meaning as woven intertextually. 
His gesture of spacing and positioning texts serves, above and 
beyond existing conventions of citation, referencing or allusion, to 
give a material figuration to the intertexuality he sees as permeating 
his texts as readings. Conceiving of  the textual spacing on the basis 
of  a hymeneal logic, by which the visual textual space both relates 
and differentiates—acts as a conduit between, and divides the 
elements it lies between—Derrida avails of  the opportunity that 
textual spaces provide to multiply their potential senses; he invites 
or obliges the reader to invest the space and distribution with 
sense. As such, Derrida’s spacings function akin to the way that 
certain nonphonetic marks do—in the way a question or 
exclamation mark functions, or in the way parentheses section off  
a part of  the text and institute a certain unspoken relation between 
the “parenthetical” remarks and the text within which they lie. His 
laying emphasis on the spacing goes hand in hand with suggesting 
the contingency of  the relations between its parts, deferring any 
sense of  a final, univocal sense. As such, any gesture multiplying 
the materiality, augmenting its intransigence to the movement of  
signification, acts as a call to interpretation. 




Indeed, we here approach the relation between irreducibly 
textual spacing and its potentiality to subvert what Derrida calls the 
phonocentrism of  the Western tradition, which is the thesis of  the 
natural priority and superiority of  the spoken word, the 
hierarchical privileging of  alphabetic-phonetic speech over other 
forms of  writing. To illustrate the phonocentrism underlying 
Western philosophy—Derrida has done so in countless readings 
of  thinkers across the tradition—let us restrict ourselves to Hegel. 
For Hegel, the relations between speech and all forms of  writing 
are determined dialectically; meaning is a product of  dialectical 
sublation, of  Aufhebung. Hegel celebrates the dual and seemingly 
opposed meanings contained in this one word (aufheben): the senses 
of  negation and of  raising up describe perfectly for Hegel the 
operation of  signification, by which a material signifier is at once 
negated and raised up to the form of  meaning (Bedeutung). Hegel 
had emphasized the “physical ideality” of  speech as a medium, 
over and against the exterior materiality of  the medium of  writing: 
the element of  sound or the voice is, for Hegel, physically ideal to 
the extent that sound spontaneously dissipates upon its utterance, 
allowing the vocal signifier to disappear before the “evocation” or 
summoning of  the signified meaning it will have made possible. 
For Hegel, sound and the voice are thus perfectly suited to 
communication. The voice is the spiritual element of  meaning that 
takes on no outwardly obtrusive material form. While Hegel 
asserted the superiority of  alphabetic-phonetic writing over other 
forms of  writing—on account of  its medium replicating speech 
insofar as possible—he nonetheless adjudged it inferior to spoken 
discourse on account of  the intransigent materiality. 
Writing resists the totalizing dialectical sublation by which the 
vocal signifier, allegedly, erases itself. The materiality of  writing 




(both inscription and the spaces on which it depends) is never in 
fact negated completely, if  by the negation of  the material “vocal 
signifier” is meant that meaning transcends the material conditions 
of  its production, becomes elevated over the context of  its 
utterance, rises above the particularity of  its language, and so on. 
Derrida’s use of  unconventional textual gestures impedes the 
supposedly seamless movement of  signification from material 
signifier to signified, of  alphabetic-phonetic writing being 
decipherable qua pure transcription of  the spoken word. Bringing 
to prominence, rather than reducing or allowing to fade into 
obsolescence, the materiality of  the mechanisms involved in the 
generation of  signification constitutes a gesture resisting the 
idealizing determination of  linguistic meaning as attaining a 
univocal, timeless sense. 
For Derrida, Hegel fails to recognize non-phonetic elements in 
alphabetic-phonetic writing. 13  He systematically overlooks the 
prose text’s resistance to being simply returned to the spoken 
word. Textual spacing does not allow alphabetic-writing to be the 
mere transcription of  speech, or for it to be “translated back” into 
the spoken word without remainder—without the stubborn resistance 
of  spaces that do not permit of  simple articulation. Derrida has  
 
 
13 Hegel does, in fact, recognize and affirm that reading, for the educated Westerner, has long 
since become, in effect, “hieroglyphic.” Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827-8, trans. Robert R. 
Williams (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 229. We recognize whole words 
by their visual contours, and do so independently of transforming them piecemeal into phonemes 
that, when conjoined, we recognize as words, syntagms and so on. The activity of reading ceases, 
in the developed intellect, to be the syllable-by-syllable deciphering characteristic of the child 
learning to read by reading out loud; it has ceased to be the careful, painstaking transformation of 
the written text into the vocalizable sounds that—in this vocal form and this form only—can then 
be understood. On the contrary, as Hegel points out, the written words on the page are read more 
or less as such, having become recognizable in themselves. And to this eventuality, spacing, far 
from amounting to the waste matter in reading as a process of deciphering meaning in inscription, 
will have been integral.  




described the différance of  meaning as the Hegelian Aufhebung 
written otherwise, as rewriting the operation of  negation and of  
raising up; the raising up is interminably frustrated, left as it were in 
mid-air, attaining only the provisionality of  an interpretation. Both 
the textual spacing that is operative within conventional textual 
elements (footnotes, titles, and so on), as well as his own textual 
spacing, resist any attempt to reduce the text to a pure expression 
of  the voice.  
We must recognize that both types of  spacing—the conventional 
use of  spacing and Derrida’s ostensibly unprecedented spacing—are 
both non-phonetic. We cannot understand the relation of  title to 
the text, or of  the footnote to the point at which it is referred in 
the text, or the preface to the body of  the text, simply in terms of  
alphabetic-phonetic spacing—in terms of  a spacing that replicates a 
vocal element in speech. We can recognize textual spacing to be 
irreducibly textual because it is not the syntactical spacing that 
parses out words, that “replicates” the pauses between spoken 
words in the materiality of  a blank space on a page. The spacing in 
question—that which surrounds footnotes, opening up the 
possibility of titles, as well as those textual spaces Derrida seems to 
“institute”—is not the typographical spacing between words 
interpretable in terms of a syntactical code. The visual spacing 
makes no referral to a syntactical code that governs speech or 
alphabetic-phonetic writing, and to which we are referred by the 
spaces parsing out the parts of  speech composing a sentence or 
syntagmatic unity. It is not the spacing between words that, on the 
face of it, replicates the pauses between words that allow them to 
be distinguished, and to have inferred between them syntactical 
relations. There will always be a remainder to the phonocentric 
determination of  the prose text. Even if  one can speak about, or 




describe the space in Glas, the deciphering of  the text is incomplete 
so long as the text is not referred and submitted to the other text, 
for as long as it is not submitted to an interpretation. The more 
that materiality figures in the movement from signifier to 
signified—as it does when textual spaces impress upon written 
signifiers—the less we can presuppose the meaning generated to 
amount to an ideality that attains an independent, transcendent 
status beyond the necessity of  interpretation. 
This non-phonetic, non-syntactical spacing cannot be described 
as simply irrational or non-rational. The generation of a form of 
writing, of the text written in prose, differentiated from the spoken 
word, has been integral to Western rationality’s conception of 
itself. The textual disposal of  space has been critical to the 
development of  the characteristics of  the formal written prose 
work. Without a certain utilization and deployment of the material 
of the page, the apparatus identifiable with prose writing would be 
unthinkable. And it compels Derrida to pose the question of  how 
the Western philosophical tradition could possibly have been 
phonocentric when the spatiality of so-called phonetic writing has 
been integral to the philosophical tradition and to the form it has 
given the logos in the written prose text. 
We ought not to be surprised, then, by Derrida’s gestures 
regarding textual spacing as performing non-phonetic functions, as 
though this apparent intrusion of  the indexical, visual function 
represented a new departure in Western writing. We ought not to 
be surprised by the relative nebulousness of  the spacings’ meaning, 
since all textual spacings are vague to the extent that they are not 
articulated by a formal determination of  their function. Derrida’s 
experiments in textual spacing do not introduce a wholly new 
spatial dimension into the text; they simply make use of the 




irreducibly textual non-phonetic, non-syntactical spacing in 
unorthodox ways. Once we recognize their shared non-phonetic 
character, the similarity between the textual spacing in the cases of  
the textual conventions examined and in Derrida’s experimental 
gestures can be seen in terms of  their operation and function. For 
all their apparent novelty, Derrida’s gestures of textual spacing can 
be understood to be in keeping with the tradition of organizing the 
text, and devising irreducibly textual components; they can be so 
interpreted at least to the extent that formalized textual spatial 
conventions have, historically, done much to establish and develop 
the independence that the written work or book enjoys vis-à-vis 
the spoken word and conversational language.  
Derrida’s readings of  specific notes, titles, and so on, reveal the 
very vacuity and imprecision of  textual spaces as “signifiers.” The 
textual spacing as a remainder, as irreducible non-phonetic 
element, does not always permit of  simple or easy interpretation. 
Derrida’s readings of  these phenomena suggest that the logic 
underlying them does not always let itself  be taken at face value: it 
is amenable to the sorts of  twists in logic to which we saw the 
preface, title, and footnote are subject in Derrida’s readings. We 
have seen in the orthodox use of  the preface, as Hegel spoke of  
the preface erasing itself  before the work proper, a convoluted 
function figured in the space opened up by the preface between 
itself  and the work. While textual spacing can come to be 
conventionally determined, the conventionalization required to 
give the spacing “surrounding” titles and footnotes and so, on a 
more or less constant function, can be defied by the individual text, 
and by the use to which the spacing is put.  
We cannot exclude Derrida’s gestures on the basis of this 
spacing performing wholly other functions to those implicitly 




accepted conventions. We can, to be sure, be surprised by his 
innovations because of the revolution they suggest in our 
conception of textual meaning. To be sure, we can recognize that 
the lack of  familiarity forces us to interpret where, in other cases, 
customary usage ordinarily disburdens us of  this task. To reject 
them out of  hand would be to refute the possibility of  all 
innovation in the domain of  textual spacing, all the innovations 
involved in the apparatus by which the written prose text has come 
to be what it is. To reject them as being nebulous or as merely 
suggestive of  the interrelations between elements in the text, 
would be to reject all textual spacing. For while irreducibly textual 
spaces take on conventional functions over time and because of 
precedent, all conventions have had to come into being on the 
basis of an invention or innovation that precedes any such process 
of determination. In the end, a redefined conception of textual 
spacing presents us with a conception of the text as haunted by 
absences that are appositely figured in the blankness of textual 
spaces; but, equally, the text has always been haunted by the 
indeterminacy of spaces that do not bespeak their logic. Textual 
spaces beckon the reader to the work of configuring and 
reconfiguring sense to be made from a text, whether or not it 
figures conventional, formalized relations or wholly new 
conventions. But in this, the distinction between Derrida’s 
apparently unprecedented acts of textual spacing, and those we 
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